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Abstract
This paper examines the fidelity requirements for flight simulators to improve training and address the problems associated 
with rotorcraft loss of control in-flight (LOC-I). To set the context, trends in rotorcraft accident statistics are presented. The 
data show that, despite recent safety initiatives, LOC-I rotorcraft accidents have been identified as a significant and growing 
contribution to accident rates. In the late 1990s, the fixed-wing commercial aircraft community faced a similar situation relat-
ing to upset prevention and recovery, and through a coordinated international effort, developed a focussed training programme 
to reduce accident rates. Lessons learned from the fixed-wing programme are presented to highlight how improved rotorcraft 
modelling and simulation tools are required to reduce rotorcraft accidents through higher quality, simulator-based training 
programmes. Relevant flight simulator certification standards are reviewed, with an emphasis on flight-model fidelity and 
vestibular motion cueing requirements. The findings from rotorcraft modelling and motion cueing research, that highlight 
relevant fidelity issues, are presented to identify areas for further activities to enhance the fidelity of simulators standards 
for use in LOC-I prevention training.
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List of symbols
δlat  Pilot lateral cyclic control displacement 
(inches)
Δϕpk  Peak roll axis attitude change from trim (°)
Δθ4  Pitch attitude response from trim at 4 s (°)
ωhpϕ  Roll-axis break frequency (rad/s)
h  Vertical position (m)
p, q, r  Angular velocity components of helicopter 
about fuselage x-, y-, z-axes (°/s)
ṗ  Roll acceleration (°/s2)
uh  Horizontal touchdown velocity (m/s)
v, w  Translational velocity components of the 
helicopter along the fuselage y-, z-axes (m/s)
wh  Vertical touchdown velocity (m/s)
x  Horizontal position (m)
Kϕ, Ky  Roll and sway motion gains (–)
Lq  Rolling moment due to pitch rate (1/s)
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IR  Intervention Recommendations
LOC-I  Loss of Control In-Flight
NTSB  National Transportation Safety Board
OEI  One Engine Inoperative
OMCT  Objective Motion Cueing Test
RCAH  Rate–Command–Attitude–Hold
SFR  Simulator Fidelity Rating
SPS  Standard Problem Statements
SUPRA  Simulation of Upset Recovery in Aviation
UIMC  Unintended Flight in Instrument Meteoro-
logical Conditions
UPRT  Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
USJHAT  US Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team
USHST  US Helicopter Safety Team
1 Introduction
The safety of rotorcraft operations has been a major area 
of concern for several decades. Initiatives have been intro-
duced with the motivation of reducing accident rates through 
improved designs, operational procedures, training, and rein-
forcement of a safety culture in the operational community. 
In his 2006 Alexander Nikolsky Lecture, “No Accidents 
– That’s the Objective” [1], Franklin Harris cited his analysis 
of over 10,000 accidents in the period 1964–2005, (derived 
from the same author’s NASA report [2]), wherein he iden-
tified several concerning trends. As shown in Fig. 1, whilst 
there was a downward trend in the number of accidents per 
year over the period analysed, the approximately linear trend 
suggested that it could be 2060 before the numerator of any 
accident statistics would become “zero”. Within the data, 
several observed “spikes” were attributed to the introduc-
tion of new aircraft types into fleets. This serves as a word 
of caution for the current drive to develop new eVTOL air-
craft; i.e., careful consideration of the design, the handling 
qualities (HQs) and operational capability of new vehicles 
should be central to any new rotorcraft development. The 
need to improve vehicle designs, conferring excellent han-
dling qualities, to the point “where pilot errors, in any shape 
or form attributable to deficient flight characteristics, are 
things of the past” was also a key message from Padfield’s 
2012 Alexander Nikolsky lecture [3].
In his analysis, Harris also drew attention to a range 
of HQs issues, e.g., poor auto-rotational performance and 
the susceptibility to loss of directional control in the cur-
rent fleet. Harris identified an undesirable trend that loss 
of control in-flight (LOC-I) related accidents had doubled 
as a percentage in the period analysed, as shown in Fig. 2, 
accounting for 12% of commercial and 32% of general avia-
tion accidents. Harris made several recommendations to 
improve rotorcraft safety, including continuing to review the 
accidents statistics for common causal factors, encourag-
ing academia to be more involved with research to improve 
rotorcraft safety, and to “beg, borrow or steal a copy of 
NASA/TM-2000-209597” [2] to better understand, where 
gains in safety can be achieved.
Following on from Harris’ work, the need to reduce 
accident rates was the focus of the International Helicop-
ter Safety Team (IHST). Formed in 2005 to address fac-
tors affecting the “unacceptable” helicopter accident rate, 
the IHST’s mission was to facilitate an 80% reduction in 
accident rates in the decade to 2016. Its strategy for tackling 
accident rates was based on the data-driven approach used 
by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) formed 
in 1997. Figure 3 shows the change in the accident rates 
following the start of the IHST initiative [4]. Whilst there 
has been a decrease in the total number of accidents during 
the IHST activities (over 20% achieved by 2016), this has 
not met the target that was set. The trend for the number of 
fatal accidents appears almost flat suggesting that a “zero-
accident” year might not occur until after 2040.
Fig. 1  Hours flown and accidents per year [2] Fig. 2  Illustration of the increase of LOC accidents [2]
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To understand the main causal factors of accidents, the 
US Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team (USJHAT) com-
pleted a review of 523 U.S. helicopter accidents from 2006 
to 2011. The review showed that loss of control (LOC) was 
the main factor in 217 (41%) of the accidents [5] as shown 
in Fig. 4. LOC occurrences, which included ground events, 
are defined when the pilot loses control due to improper 
handling of the aircraft, e.g., poor performance management 
or improperly responding to on-board emergencies, rather 
than due to a structural or mechanically initiated problem.
It is evident from these statistics that further work is 
required to reduce LOC-related accidents and improve 
safety. One area that could help in the reduction of accident 
rates is the use of flight simulators to enhance LOC/LOC-I 
pilot training. The aim of this paper is to review current 
flight simulator fidelity standards and identify new areas 
of research to enhance simulators to address the problems 
associated with rotorcraft LOC-I through ‘enhanced’ flight 
simulator training.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
approach adopted by the fixed-wing community to address 
their unacceptable LOC-I accident rates, discusses the key 
success factors of their work and how they might be applied 
in new initiatives to reduce rotorcraft LOC-I accident rates. 
A review of rotorcraft safety initiatives follows in Sect. 3. 
The need for ‘improved’ simulation fidelity is discussed in 
Sects. 4 and 5 in relation to flight model enhancements, ves-
tibular motion cueing research and a subjective method for 
assessing simulation fidelity. Future research challenges to 
support LOC-I simulator training are presented in Sect. 6 
together with the proposed next steps for initiating a new 
rotorcraft simulator safety activity.
2  Fixed‑wing LOC‑I accident rate initiatives
One of the themes of the paper is to examine other aviation 
safety initiatives that have reduced accident rates and how 
their success factors might be transferred to the rotorcraft 
community.
Lambregts et al. [8] undertook a review of fixed-wing 
upset accidents over a 15-year period (1993–2007). They 
identified that LOC accidents, involving an aircraft upset, 
were the major type of accidents for transport aircraft. At 
this time, an aircraft upset was defined as any event with:
• Pitch exceeding 25/− 10°,
• Bank angle exceeding ± 45°, or
• Inappropriate airspeed.
Lambregts et al. challenged this definition, citing the 
Armavia Flight 967 accident at Sochi [10], where the air-
craft had a pitch attitude of only − 5°, well within the limits 
above, but due to the low altitude of the aircraft it was not in 
a “normal” condition. The definition of an aircraft upset was 
subsequently redefined by the International Committee for 
Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE) as an 
“unintended deviation from the desired flight path”.
Reference [6] also emphasised that upset/LOC accidents 
are not confined to one type of aircraft operation, e.g., trans-
port, they occur across the fleet, e.g., general aviation, mili-
tary. Furthermore, LOC-I accidents were reported as “not 
a problem of yesteryear”, which is highlighted in Boeing’s 
commercial accident statistics shown in Fig. 5 [9].1 Lam-
bregts et al.’s analysis of the statistics highlighted the need 
for research to identify the root causes of this problem. Not 
unexpectedly, stall was subsequently reported as the main 
causal factor leading to LOC-I accidents (see Fig. 6). Based 
on their analysis, the need for new regulations and train-
ing programmes was reported to improve flight safety. This 
Fig. 3  Accident rate trends following IHST initiative [4]
Fig. 4  Top five occurrence categories in USJHAT study [5]
1 Note: Only the top 6 causes have been included for clarity of figure.
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required a coordinated approach to address prevention of 
such upsets and associated recovery procedures.
The need to develop new training requirements was 
also identified in the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) report on the 2009 Colgan Air accident. The report 
indicated that the probable cause of the accident was the 
captain's inappropriate response to the activation of the stick 
shaker. This led to an aerodynamic stall and a loss of con-
trol on approach from which the airplane did not recover 
[11]. Published in 2010, the NTSB report contained sev-
eral recommendations including the need to: “Define and 
codify minimum simulator model fidelity requirements to 
support an expanded set of stall recovery training require-
ments, including recovery from stalls that are fully devel-
oped. These simulator fidelity requirements should address 
areas, such as angle-of-attack and sideslip angle ranges, 
motion cueing (authors’ emphasis added), proof-of-match 
with post-stall flight test data, and warnings to indicate when 
the simulator flight envelope has been exceeded”.
It should also be mentioned that, prior to recovery from 
a stall, the airplane pilot must recognise its presence, and 
be taught how to:
(a) Be aware of threats that could cause the stall (environ-
ment, systems, pilot-induced).
(b) Confirm the stall based on the available flight instru-
ment readings and
(c) Apply the appropriate intervention as early as possible.
Essentially, this is the concept of Threat and Error Man-
agement training, which first teaches threat identification 
(e.g., weather, time pressure, distractions, operational haz-
ards), and then assesses how well these are managed. This 
concept is mentioned because of the imperative to consider 
the entire training of the pilot or crew, and not only the qual-
ity of the Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD).
The need to address LOC-I accidents for fixed-wing air-
craft was a central theme for the Royal Aeronautical Soci-
ety’s Flight Simulation Group (FSG) 2009 Spring Confer-
ence entitled: ‘Flight Simulation: Towards the Edge of the 
Envelope’ [12]; this initiative was also cited in the NTSB 
Colgan Air accident report.
Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) was 
proposed as a major potential contributor to enhancing avia-
tion safety, primarily since it would introduce measures to 
prevent upsets. The loss of Air France 447 [13] coincided 
with the start of the conference, a sobering reminder of the 
importance of the work to come. ICATEE [14] was formed 
during the FSG Conference to deliver a long-term strat-
egy for reducing the rate of LOC-I accidents and incidents 
through enhanced UPRT [15]. A key factor in the success of 
the work was that the Committee consisted of more than 80 
members drawn from manufacturers, airlines, national avia-
tion authorities and safety boards, simulator manufacturers, 
training providers, research institutions, academia and the 
pilot community.
ICATEE analysed the causes of LOC-I and created 
two work streams. The Training and Regulations Stream 
addressed the development of a UPRT requirements matrix, 
whilst the Research and Technology Stream performed a 
thorough analysis of the technological requirements for 
UPRT [15]. The Research and Technology stream reported 
that enhanced flight dynamics models representing post-
stall behaviour and icing effects were lacking. Key conclu-
sions and recommendations from the ICATEE work were 
as follows:
• New initiatives required an integrated approach across 
the fixed-wing community including manufacturers, 
airlines, national aviation authorities and safety boards, 
simulator manufacturers, training providers, research 
institutions and pilot representatives,
Fig. 5  Aviation accident occurrence categories 2009–2018 [9]
Fig. 6  Numbers of LOC-I incidents and contributing factors
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• For awareness and recognition (i.e., “prevention” train-
ing), current simulators without modification could be 
utilized if used in a more meaningful and proper manner,
• Type-representative models are suitable for recovery 
training from stalls. Models do not need to be exact per 
aircraft type, but need to support the training objectives,
• The development and maintenance of applicable aero-
nautical knowledge should complement simulator train-
ing, to improve pilots’ awareness of the fundamentals 
of aerodynamics, stall, cockpit indications and human 
factors,
• Enhancements require validation by Subject Matter 
Experts and pilots, who must be properly qualified to 
assess the enhancements,
• Clear articulation of the training benefit enhancements 
that can be derived from a range of training media.
Above all, international standards and civil aviation regu-
lations would have to be adjusted to accommodate the new 
UPRT requirements (training, licensing and FSTDs).
The impact of the ICATEE work was that their recom-
mendations resulted in a new ICAO Document 10011, 
“Manual on Aeroplane Upset Prevention and Recovery 
Training” [16]. National Aviation Authority regulations have 
also been impacted, with UPRT becoming a mandatory part 
of European civil-airline training programmes from Decem-
ber 2019 [17], and the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) 
requiring all Part 121 airline pilots to be UPRT-trained by 
March 31st 2020 [18]. LOC-I prevention and UPRT feature 
strongly in the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) 
[19], with several Rule Making Tasks listed to improve 
safety by engaging key stakeholders, e.g., pilots, instructors, 
examiners, airline training organisations and operators. To 
ensure that the fixed-wing simulator qualification processes 
keep in line with the new training programmes, specifically 
related to UPRT, it has been acknowledged that updates to 
the simulator standards are required [20], reflecting the need 
for a more dynamic and data-driven approach to standards 
development. For example, to provide ‘useful’ vestibular 
cues to a pilot requires tuning of the motion platform. Objec-
tive motion cueing criteria have been developed [21] and 
implemented into fixed-wing simulators in response to the 
need for improved motion cueing in UPRT programmes.
2.1  Lessons learned from the fixed‑wing UPRT 
programme
In terms of applying the lessons learned from the ICATEE 
work to rotary-wing LOC-I safety activities, there are a 
range of transferable items that would benefit any new rotor-
craft safety initiatives; examples include:
• Adopting the approach suggested by Harris and ICATEE 
to conduct a thorough review of causal factors, related to 
both accidents and current training practices and needs, 
would be an important first step to define future activi-
ties.
• Examining and updating the definition of LOC-I as con-
ducted by ICATEE; a similar statement is required for 
rotorcraft.
• Identifying similar LOC-I contributing factors, e.g., pilot 
distraction or ineffective pilot monitoring. This could be 
addressed by developing skills for improved recognition 
and awareness of these events, especially when work-
ing as part of a crew. Through exposure to the potential 
confusion of upsets, UPRT assists pilots in developing 
reliable mental models of how they, and the aircraft, are 
oriented in space; adopting this approach would also ben-
efit rotary-wing pilots.
• Training exercises are learnt by rote and hence pilots have 
an expectation of what is to occur during the session. 
Exposing them to a different scenario so that they can 
experience the ‘startle’ factor could aid them in manag-
ing stressful events in the future. Landman et al. [22] 
have investigated this training problem and shown that 
pilots who were not presented with “highly scripted” sce-
narios were more likely to apply the correct skills than 
pilots who were trained in those scenarios.
• ICATEE required a coordinated effort, not just in terms 
of stakeholders, but also in the media used to deliver the 
training.
One of the most significant ICATEE findings, based on an 
analysis of several LOC-I accident reports from safety inves-
tigation boards, was that pilots often do not recognise the 
airplane angle of attack or understand the aircraft’s energy, 
both of which must be managed to prevent an upset. Energy 
management is particularly important during the approach 
to landing. At flight speeds below minimum power there is a 
risk that the aircraft could enter a speed-unstable condition, 
exacerbated by incorrect control actions by pilots. Examples 
in the recent past are the crashes of Asiana Flt 214 [Boeing 
777, Ref. 23] and CHC G-WNSB [AS332, Ref. 24]. In both 
cases, the crew’s mismanagement of the aircraft speed and 
flight path led to entry into irrecoverable conditions. Refer-
ence [25] describes the theory underlying such speed insta-
bility at low speed, providing aeronautical science training 
material for pilots to strengthen their competency. Under-
standing the threats and applying competencies to mitigate 
those threats is paramount. One of the competencies defined 
by ICAO is “Flight Path Management – Manual Control” 
[26], which includes monitoring and maintaining the desired 
flight path, and controlling the aircraft within the normal 
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envelope. It is, however, important to understand that the 
pilot must utilise all competencies to maintain an accept-
able level of safety throughout the flight. The competencies 
developed by airline pilots also generally apply to rotorcraft 
operations. These are:
1. Knowledge.
2. Application of procedures.
3. Flight path management—manual control.
4. Flight management—guidance and automation.
5. Leadership and teamwork.




The composition of these within the rotorcraft environ-
ment will differ slightly. An obvious example occurs in sin-
gle-pilot operations. which are not permitted in commercial 
CS-25 certified fixed-wing operations, where “Leadership 
and Teamwork” may not apply.
ICATEE recommended making greater use of flight 
simulators to develop the knowledge and skills related to 
prevention of upsets, rather than teaching rote responses to 
developed upsets, as had been trained in the past. Moreover, 
UPRT should become a training opportunity rather than a 
pilot testing programme.
As a result, the ICATEE team determined that 56% of the 
new training programme could be developed with existing 
Level D simulators combined with academic lessons [15]. 
To achieve further benefit from the use of simulators would 
require flight-model enhancements to better represent the 
physics, e.g., post-stall behaviour. A similar approach could 
be adopted for rotary-wing applications, namely, establish-
ing the main causal factors and conducting a task analy-
sis to identify gaps in current flight models that need to be 
addressed.
Whilst ICATEE focussed on upset prevention, the Sim-
ulation of Upset Recovery in Aviation (SUPRA) project 
examined the model and cueing fidelity requirements for 
fixed-wing post-stall recovery [27, 28]. The research indi-
cated that whilst the pilots involved in the testing reported 
that the post-stall flight modelling was “representative” of 
their real-world experience, the majority implemented an 
incorrect recovery technique fixating on addressing any wing 
drop instead of prioritising angle of attack reduction. Inter-
vention of the instructors was required to enhance the pilots’ 
basic knowledge of and reactions to stall recovery, reinforc-
ing the ICATEE findings. A key finding of the SUPRA work 
was that provision of ‘appropriate’ vestibular cueing was an 
important part of the training; a topic we return to later in 
the paper.
Another addition to FSTDs, that supports UPRT, is the 
ability for the instructor to know that the training is taking 
place within validated bounds of the flight model. During 
some manoeuvres, the pilot may bring the simulator close 
to the edge of the validated flight envelope. This informa-
tion should be known by the instructor to enable them to 
judge the realism of the exercises being conducted and to 
prevent negative training transfer. UPRT was initially devel-
oped and implemented into aviation training regulations to 
address deficiencies in pilot skills and knowledge regard-
ing upset recognition, prevention and recovery. Industry 
concluded that these shortcomings contribute to LOC-I 
incidents and accidents. Now that initial UPRT has been 
completed by most airlines, UPRT is becoming an ongoing 
practice and part of regular training to maintain pilot com-
petencies. Accordingly, it has been proposed by industry 
that competency-based training, as well as the creation of 
training scenarios derived from lessons learned related to 
real-world events (Evidence-Based Training) can provide a 
realistic and applicable context to pilot skills maintenance. 
A similar methodology could be adopted in helicopter train-
ing simulators.
From the fixed-wing UPRT initiative, it is clear that a 
coordinated activity was required across the training, regula-
tion and research communities to identify the main causal 
factors for LOC-I accidents and the process for mitigation 
using simulation; these lessons-learned can be applied in the 
rotorcraft community.
3  Challenge areas for rotorcraft LOC‑I 
modelling and simulation
Drawing on the experience and approach used by the ICA-
TEE team, key questions have been identified to inform 
the requirements for future LOC-I modelling and simula-
tion activities. The following sections will draw on these 
questions, highlighting gaps that need addressing in current 
practices and opportunities that are available to support new 
rotorcraft safety initiatives. The questions are:
 Q1. What are the main causal factors that contribute to heli-
copter LOC-I?
 Q2. What human factors issues play a role in these acci-
dents?
 Q3. Which pilot competencies are involved that fail in these 
accidents?
 Q4. How can helicopter pilot competencies be better 
trained?
 Q5. What are the requirements for better training methods, 
scenarios and tools?
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 Q6. How can any missing physics from simulation models 
be identified to enhance models that are fit for pur-
pose?
 Q7. What are the simulator cueing requirements to support 
LOC-I training?
 Q8. What are the fidelity requirements for predictive (i.e., 
flight model) and perceptual (i.e., overall simulation) 
fidelity for LOC-I training simulators?
 Q9. What benefits do alternative training and simulation 
tools offer, e.g., virtual or augmented reality?
3.1  Rotary‑wing safety initiatives
The IHST activity (2005–2016), to reduce the worldwide 
helicopter accident rate, contributed to a reduction in acci-
dent rates from 4.61 to 3.49 per 100,000 h with the fatal 
accident rate reducing from 1.4 to 0.61 per 100,000 h (it 
should be noted that gathering ‘accurate’ number of flight 
hours is difficult and the values quoted are best estimates). 
The initial ISHST studies catalysed further analysis of the 
causes of rotorcraft accidents (Q1), identifying that LOC-I 
was a factor in 41% of the accidents analysed.
The USJHAT proposed a range of intervention recom-
mendations (IRs) (see Fig. 7) to reduce accident rates [29], 
including the following training (T) related IRs:
• T1060—simulator training—basic manoeuvres, develop 
and implement a standard for pilot training focusing on 
operational-specific scenarios, human factors (Q2), and 
the use of simulators and flight training devices (FTDs) 
(Q5)
• T2060—simulator training—advanced manoeuvres (Q4). 
Incorporate simulators into training programmes that 
would include dynamic rollover, emergency procedures 
training (Q3), ground resonance, quick stop manoeuvres, 
targeting approach procedures and practice in approaches 
to pinnacle, unimproved landing areas, and elevated plat-
forms
• T6019—training emphasis for maintaining awareness of 
cues critical to safe flight (Q3). Establish training pro-
grammes that train and evaluate proficiency of critical 
issues, such as systems failures, impending weather con-
cerns, effects of density altitude, and wind and surface 
conditions that can become critical to safe flight.
The USHST undertook an analysis of 104 fatal helicopter 
accidents (2009–2013) to help identify the main common 
occurrence categories [30] (Q1). Using the CAST/ICAO 
Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) occurrence categories, 
the three main categories contributing to half of the fatal 
accidents in that period were: LOC-I, defined as loss of air-
craft control or deviation from intended flightpath whilst 
in-flight, Unintended Flight in Instrument Meteorological 
Conditions (UIMC) and Low-Altitude (LALT) Operations 
(Fig. 8).
In 2016, the US Helicopter Safety Team (USHST, formed 
in 2013 as a regional partner with IHST), adopted a new 
goal of achieving a 20% reduction in the US fatal helicopter 
accident rate by 2020, equating to 0.61 fatal accidents per 
100,000 flight hours. The average fatal accident rate for the 
Fig. 7  Top IRs from the USJHAT [29]. (Note: percentages are not to 
sum to 100% as each accident was assigned multiple intervention rec-
ommendations)
Fig. 8  Pareto chart of U.S. civil helicopter fatal accident data (2009–
2013) [31]
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period 2015–2019 was 0.65, and the latest goal is to reduce 
the 5-year average fatal accident rate to 0.55 by 2025 [28].
This analysis of the accidents led to the identification of 
intervention strategies that could be implemented through 
Helicopter Safety Enhancement (H-SE) activities to tackle 
the underlying causal factors (Q1–7). Each H-SE identifies 
the organisations or groups who will implement the activ-
ity, a statement of the work required (informed by details 
of relevant accidents) and expected outputs; two simulator 
related activities were cited.
Starting in October 2019, H-SE 81, “Improve Simulator 
Modeling for Outside-the-Envelope Flight Conditions” was 
established to “improve the accuracy of full flight simulators 
(FFS)/flight training devices by providing recommendations 
for developing better mathematical physics-based models 
(authors’ emphasis added) for helicopter flight dynamics” 
(Q6). The goal is to “achieve more realistic, higher fidelity 
simulations of outside-the-envelope flight conditions” and 
to examine the “possible use of simulation for purposes of 
preventing, recognizing, and recovering from spatial diso-
rientation” (Q8).
H-SE 127A, “Training for Recognition/Recovery of Spa-
tial Disorientation” aims to “develop training for recogni-
tion of spatial disorientation (SD) and recovery to controlled 
flight.” It is acknowledged in this H-SE that the helicopter 
community should promote the wider use of available SD 
simulation technology and training scenarios (Q5) to cre-
ate further awareness of impairment from SD and how to 
recover from such an event. Commencing January 2019, a 
review of current training documents and practices is under-
way to identify areas, where training can be enhanced [32].
The need for the wider use of flight simulators to prepare 
helicopter pilots for emergencies and improve safety is also 
acknowledged by the NTSB, in their 2015 Safety Announce-
ment, “Safety Through Helicopter Simulators” [33], where 
they note, “it is difficult to recreate the element of surprise 
and the realistic, complex scenarios that pilots may experi-
ence during an emergency. Without simulators, viable les-
son components may be limited”; a theme also noted in the 
ICATEE work. The challenge here is to develop simulators 
(Q7) and scenarios (Q5) to support this training. What is 
not included in the Safety Announcement are the necessary 
simulation fidelity requirements to conduct such training.
Effective pilot training can be developed when the issues 
and causal factors related to rotary-wing LOC-I are under-
stood and defined. The European Helicopter Safety Analysis 
Team (EHSAT), in their accident review [6] (Q1) support-
ing the IHST initiative, reported that “pilot judgment and 
actions, and situational awareness” (Q3) were two of the 
most common contributors to accidents; reinforcing IHST’s 
findings.
EHSAT, a sub-group of the European Helicopter Safety 
Team (EHEST), conducted reviews of two sets of accident 
data, 2000–2005 and 2006–2010. In this latter period, some 
national teams were not able to analyse their results, so only 
30% of the 527 accidents that occurred were included in the 
analysis. The output of the data analysis was not presented 
in the same manner as the USHST’s work, making direct 
comparisons of the causal factors difficult. Figure 9 shows 
the standard problem statements (SPS) Level 1 that were 
reported in the two periods. In the IHST taxonomy of the 14 
main factors contributing to an accident, Level 1 identifies 
the main area of the problem, e.g., safety management, pilot 
judgement and actions. Pilot judgment featured in almost 
70% of all accidents analysed and situation awareness in 
more than 33%.
Whilst Fig. 9 provides some insight into causal factors, it 
does not present those specifically related to LOC-I. Further 
investigation of what leads pilots to lose situational aware-
ness and/or impact judgement and action is needed, together 
Fig. 9  Percentage of analysed accidents, where SPS Level 1 was 
assigned at least once [6]
Fig. 10  Number of IRs Level 1—all accidents 2000–2010 [6]
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with an examination of the conditions they take place in 
(Q2 and Q3). This could be related, for example, to startle, 
spatial disorientation, improper instrument monitoring or 
fatigue. Adopting the ICATEE approach to understanding 
these underlying human factors issues should facilitate better 
problem identification and define competencies and meth-
ods to manage these problems as part of improved training 
programmes.
In Ref. [6], various IRs were reported to address the 
above (see Fig. 10) and the results were aimed at informing 
the content of the rotorcraft section of the EPAS document 
[19]. A training/instructional IR was listed as one of the 
leading IRs, although how to conduct this is not described 
and the need for supporting research was not recommended 
as a key IR; the need for supporting research is examined 
Sects. 4 and 5.
As part of the instructional IRs, EHEST has produced a 
variety of material to raise awareness of safety issues in the 
rotorcraft community. Reference [34], addressing “Train-
ing and Testing of Emergency and Abnormal Procedures in 
Helicopters”, shows that a significant number of helicopter 
accidents occur during the training or testing of emergency 
and abnormal procedures (EAP). The leaflet aims to pro-
vide guidance to instructors and examiners to deliver EAP 
in flight more safely. For Upset/Unusual Attitude Training, 
it is recommended that it should be conducted in good visual 
meteorological conditions with the candidate’s visibility lim-
ited by screens or goggles. This type of training, according 
to one former instructor [35], has hardly changed in 30 years 
and it is not clear how ‘more of the same’ will impact the 
LOC-I problem. In the fixed-wing UPRT development, the 
introduction of “failures” to enhance pilot situation aware-
ness and teach better orientation was highlighted as an area 
for improvement. These may not necessarily be system fail-
ures, but instead “blanking out” certain portions of the out-
side world and/or instrument displays to query the pilot on 
their situation at that time.
More recently in Europe, the Rotorcraft Safety Roadmap 
[7] indicates that to achieve its vision of a 50% reduction 
in accidents by 2028, improved decision-making training 
to prevent, for example, inadvertent entry into Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions and Aircraft Upset/ LOC-I are 
required and that flight simulators need to be more widely 
used throughout the training cycle (Q5).
However, simply reproducing accidents or events lead-
ing to them would have limited effectiveness, since it is not 
feasible to train every such event. In addition, this approach 
does not develop pilot resilience to unknown factors (Q3 and 
Q5). Instead, understanding how the management of threats 
and errors might have failed, and which competencies were 
particularly weak during events, allows the training designer 
to develop more robust requirements. From these training 
requirements, the corresponding flight simulation function-
ality and fidelity requirements can be postulated (Q8).
Re-visiting the fixed-wing UPRT story, it should be noted 
that few fixed-wing aircraft have a direct indication of the 
wing angle of attack, including the critical (or stall) angle 
of attack. Nonetheless, there are multiple indicators, e.g., 
onset of buffet, lack of control responsiveness, which can 
be used to determine the safety margin that could trigger 
the firing of the stall warning alert. Teaching aeronautical 
science, and helping pilots to understand these concepts, 
as well as developing enhanced situation awareness with 
respect to angle of attack, was considered paramount. This 
is because most LOC-I accidents have been associated with 
stall (Fig. 6), which is an “angle-of-attack problem”. Simi-
lar training strategies, reinforcing aeronautical science and 
safety margins, can be introduced in rotorcraft flight training, 
for example, to develop a better understanding of situational 
awareness (4 and Q5).
The EPAS document identifies the need to address off-
shore helicopter LOC-I accidents as a strategic priority. 
There have already been significant initiatives in the offshore 
helicopter community to improve safety. The UK Civil Avia-
tion Authority, together with the European Union Aviation 
Safety Authority (EASA) and the Norwegian Civil Avia-
tion Authority, initiated an offshore safety review in 2013. 
The review made 29 recommendations under the themes of: 
“Passenger Safety and Survivability, Operations, Airworthi-
ness and Improving Knowledge and Facilitating Change” 
[36]. Many of the recommendations have led to new working 
groups to continually review safety through the Offshore 
Helicopter Safety Action Group. HeliOffshore has also pub-
lished a global safety strategy document [37] identifying 
priority areas for enhancing safety, including mitigating and 
preventing aircraft upsets. Although research has been con-
ducted relating to offshore safety, e.g., to improve alerting in 
Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems [38], no 
specific research initiatives have been recommended to help 
reduce LOC-I offshore accidents. Furthermore, in the EASA 
research agenda, Sect. 2.4 “Rotorcraft”, [39], there are no 
research activities relating to LOC-I aimed at the reduction 
of accident rates. The research agenda does highlight the 
need to think “out of the box”, to look at how training with 
new device platforms, e.g., virtual reality (Q9), could be 
used to provide innovation for FSTD qualification, but it 
does not deal with specific training needs. The challenge of 
using new technologies, and how regulations might need to 
be more flexible to allow their uptake, was one of the themes 
of the Royal Aeronautical Society’s 2019 Spring Flight 
Simulation conference [40] and should also be considered 
in any new LOC-I initiatives (Q9). Developing appropriate 
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training requirements is, therefore, considered the essential 
first step (Q3–Q5).
What is absent in these rotorcraft safety initiatives is a 
clear, coordinated strategy of how to use modelling and 
simulation in training aimed to reduce accidents, and the 
supporting research required to achieve this [41–43]. As 
the increased use of simulators has been recognised as an 
important part of a strategy to improve safety, questions 
arise regarding what level of fidelity is required to achieve a 
positive transfer of training and how might this be assessed? 
Central to the utility of a simulator for delivering effective 
training is confidence in the fidelity standards against which 
it has been qualified. Uncertainties in the validity of met-
rics contained in the standards could undermine the ben-
efits of training devices. A review of previous modelling and 
simulation research follows in the next sections to identify 
shortcomings and where new contributions could be made 
to enhance existing standards.
4  Rotary‑wing aircraft modelling 
and simulation research
One objective of this paper is to highlight the research 
required to inform new regulatory activities, serving to 
reduce the number of rotorcraft LOC-I accidents. Hence, 
past and current safety-related research needs to be 
acknowledged.
Rotorcraft flight simulators in Europe are qualified 
through CS-FSDT(H) [44] which defines the technical mini-
mum requirements/standards for each level of qualification 
(or type). Within CS-FSTD(H), the following qualification 
level types are listed:
• Flight and Navigational Procedures Trainer I, II, III 
(FNPT).
• Flight Training Device 1, 2, 3 (FTD).
• Full Flight Simulator A, B, C, D (FFS).
Table 1 indicates the training value and credits that can be 
derived using the different types of flight simulators as part 
of an approved training programme [44]. The main market 
for this training is the commercial aviation sector. Reference 
[45] states that to comply with Private Pilot Licensing (PPL) 
requirements, trainees should have completed at least 45 h of 
flight instruction, five of which can be completed in FSTDs. 
It also notes, given that safety analyses point to General 
Aviation being a significant contributor to the high number 
of accidents, FSTDs should be more widely used for PPL(H) 
training, echoing the USHST’s recommendations (Q5).
CS-FSTD(H) defines the fidelity metrics and criteria that 
need to be satisfied with the certification of a flight simulator 
for crew training. From a safety perspective, these criteria 
should be robust and unambiguous. Several studies have 
been conducted to examine the validity of the CS-STD(H) 
tolerances and criteria; an overview of this research is pro-
vided here (Q8).
The Group for Aeronautical Research and Technology 
in Europe (GARTEUR) Action Group (AG) HC-AG12 was 
formed to conduct a critical examination of the simula-
tor standard, JAR-STD 1H [46], (replaced by EASA CS-
FSTD(H) in 2012), including correlation with handling qual-
ities metrics and fidelity metrics [47–49]. The work revealed 
a range of shortcomings and opportunities to enhance the 
standards with new metrics. For example, the AG showed 
that the relationship between fidelity and the JAR-STD 1H 
metric tolerances is sensitive to the nature of the manoeuvre 
being flown and, more significantly, that matching tolerances 
does not always lead to matching handling qualities (Q8). 
AG12 also identified the need to bridge the gap between 
pilot subjective opinion and the quantified metrics, and the 
importance of developing an objective means for assessing 
overall fidelity.
Table 1  Rotorcraft simulation training

















Up to 67% type rating hours






Up to 83% type rating flight 
hours
Up to 36% ab-initio flight hours









Review of flight simulation fidelity requirements to help reduce ‘rotorcraft loss of control…
1 3
In the previous section, using flight simulators to train 
for emergency situations was highlighted as an important 
approach for improving safety. In AG12, such a case was 
considered—One Engine Inoperative (OEI) landings, and 
the suitability of the CS tolerances was examined. The FAA 
and EASA regulations [50, 51] for emergencies require that, 
for Category-A certification (multi-engine helicopters), an 
aircraft should be able to continue its flight with OEI. In the 
case of an engine failure occurring after the helicopter has 
passed the landing decision point, the pilot must continue 
the landing. A four degree-of-freedom helicopter model 
(including horizontal body velocity, rate of descent, pitch 
rate and rotor rotational speed) was developed to examine 
the sensitivity of CS tolerances on a continuous landing pro-
cedure following an engine failure. The CS tolerances for 
this simulation case are given in Table 2 (note these are a 
subset of CS-FSTD(H) HQ validation tolerances).
Three test cases were developed in this study to determine 
the effect of applying CS tolerances to the simulation model 
throughout the manoeuvre:
• A reference case: no tolerances were applied to the flight 
dynamics model.
• Upper limit case: 20 ft in height, − 3 knots in velocity, 
1.5% in pitch attitude and 10% in collective.
• Lower limit case: − 20 ft in height, 3 knots in veloc-
ity, − 1.5% in pitch attitude and − 10% in collective.
A pilot model was included in the different test cases to 
control the energy stored in the rotor during the manoeuvre 
[49]. The resulting trajectories are shown in Fig. 11. A safe 
landing region was defined, where the touchdown was within 
acceptable velocity limits, namely, vertical velocity (wh) less 
than 1.5 m/s and horizontal velocity (uh) less than 4.5 m/s. 
The allowable tolerance ranges produce a landing scatter of 
200/ − 90 m from the reference case and moves the landing 
velocities outside of the safe region. From a safety point 
of view, this variation could lead to a negative transfer of 
training giving the trainee an incorrect understanding of the 
performance of the helicopter in an emergency.
Research to address the AG12 recommendations 
to develop a method for the subjective assessment of 
Fig. 11  Helicopter landing footprint with simulation tolerances limits 
[47]
Fig. 12  On- and off-axis rate responses to a longitudinal cyclic input 
for cross-coupling variations [55]
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simulator fidelity and the formulation of new objective met-
rics is reported in Refs. [52, 53]. The simulator fidelity rat-
ing (SFR) scale (see Appendix 1) was developed to provide 
a method for an evaluating pilot to rate the suitability of the 
overall simulation for a specified task [52] (Q8). The pilot is 
asked to compare the level of performance attained in flight 
and simulator, and to judge the level of ‘adaptation’ of task 
control strategy used in flight compared with simulation. 
New objective fidelity metrics [53] were also developed in 
the AG-12 follow-on research, based on ADS-33E-PRF HQ 
parameters [54] (Q8).
The methodologies developed were used to investigate 
an objective criterion that is ill-defined in CS-FSTD(H), 
related to a flight-model’s off-axis response [55]. CS-
FSTD(H) states that, following a longitudinal input, the 
on-axis response of the simulation data should be within 
either ± 10% of the achieved peak in the flight data, or ± 3°/s, 
whichever is less restrictive, and the off-axis model response 
should be of “correct trend and magnitude” (CT&M) when 
compared to flight data. Figure 12 shows the on- and off-
axis responses of a FLIGHTLAB Bell 412 (F-B412) simu-
lation model [55] (configured with a Rate–Command–Atti-
tude–Hold (RCAH) system) following a 0.5-in longitudinal 
input. Additional roll/pitch cross-couplings were imple-
mented in FLIGHTLAB [56] by directing a proportion 
(20%, 50% and 100%) of the longitudinal control input 
into the roll axis. The off-axis responses exhibit the correct 
trend and so questions arise as to whether the magnitudes 
are “correct” and what effect the difference would have on a 
pilot’s experience of the simulation?
One way to assess the effect of the additional cross cou-
plings is to use the inter-axis coupling criteria in ADS-33E-
PRF [54]. This is defined, in this case, as the ratio of peak 
off-axis roll attitude response (∆ϕpk) from trim, within 4 s, 
to the on-axis pitch attitude response from trim at 4 s, (Δθ4), 
following a longitudinal control step input. As additional 
cross-coupling is increased in the model the HQs degrade 
from Level 1 for the baseline (no addition cross-coupling) to 
Level 3, with the expectation that the fidelity’ of the model 
would be compromised (see Fig. 13).
This was assessed subjectively using the SFR scale for an 
ADS-33E-PRF acceleration–deceleration manoeuvre. Pilots 
trained in the baseline configuration and then, following a 
model change, awarded an SFR based on their comparison 
with the baseline. The results in Fig. 14 show that, as the 
cross-coupling increases, the SFRs awarded degrade from 
Level 1 to Level 3. This is indicative of a significant change 
in performance and considerable adaptation of task strat-
egy (see Appendix 1). An additional cross-coupling of 20% 
produced a mean SFR that was on the Level 1–2 boundary 
indicating that, based on their subjective opinion, this would 
represent the boundary of an acceptable level of CT&M. 
Whilst these results are not comprehensive, they do show 
that a combination of new objective metrics and subjective 
assessments can be used to investigate revisions to the CS 
standards.
The AG12 authors recommended the “need to establish 
a firmer and more substantial relationship between simula-
tion fidelity criteria and handling qualities criteria”. Whilst 
Refs. [53, 55] suggested that tolerances for HQ “fidelity met-
rics” based on objective and subjective assessments could 
be developed to define fidelity ‘levels’ of a model, especially 
in areas that are not covered in the CS, e.g., inter-axis cou-
pling and frequency domain parameters, such as bandwidth 
Fig. 13  Model configurations using ADS-33E-PRF roll/pitch cou-
pling requirements for aggressive agility [55]
Fig. 14  SFRs awarded for cross-coupling tests [55]
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and phase delay, further research is required to develop this 
approach (Q8).
To satisfy the proof-of-match tolerances for a Level D 
flight simulator, modifying or tuning the parameters of the 
flight model using either a physical or non-physical pro-
cess is permitted. System IDentification (SID) [57] has been 
applied as an effective approach for informing this tuning 
process (Q6). A non-physical tuning approach has been 
developed and reported in Ref. [58], using SID techniques to 
optimise simulation parameters that may not be known with 
certainty, e.g., rotor blade stiffness, fuselage inertias, to meet 
the flight simulator standards proof-of-match requirements. 
This approach satisfies the Level D requirements but does 
not necessarily capture any missing physics which may be 
important in, for example, LOC-I simulations.
In Ref. [59], SID was used to explore the fidelity of exist-
ing rotorcraft simulation models and to produce a rational, 
physics-based approach to simulation fidelity improvement 
through model renovation. The renovation process involves 
augmenting the nonlinear flight model based on differences 
between stability and control derivatives identified from 
flight test (FT) data and the nonlinear (Nlr) flight model. 
Figure 15 illustrates the fidelity improvement of the reno-
vated (reno.) nonlinear FLIGHTLAB Bell412 (Nlr F-B412) 
model in the roll, pitch and yaw axes for a 2311 input at 
95 kts. Identification and renovation of non-physical model-
ling parameters in the simulation models are key to improv-
ing model fidelity, especially in dynamic manoeuvres.
The above renovation method is to some extent limited 
due to the procedure relying on linear information extracted 
from the SID approach, and the tuning process for repairing 
the deficiencies in the fidelity of a model (Q6). These limi-
tations can put constraints on its application, especially 
where nonlinearities and hereditary effects can influence the 
model’s response, such as in edge-of-the-envelope and out-
of-the-envelope flight regimes, where current flight models 
are likely to be inaccurate. These deficiencies may lead to 
unrealistic training of manoeuvres involving, e.g., loss of 
tail rotor effectiveness (LTRE), vortex ring state (VRS), 
and rapid entry into autorotation; topics noted for further 
research in the H-SE activities.
The NTSB investigated 55 accidents involving LTRE dur-
ing the 10-year period from 2004 to 2014 [60]. The results 
revealed that the pilots were unable to recover when the 
helicopters encountered unanticipated yaw suffered from the 
LTRE. More recently, the ‘mythical’ properties of unantici-
pated yaw and the LTRE ‘problem’ have been discussed in 
Ref. [61]; the Airbus author emphasising the importance of 
transferring improved understanding of the phenomena to 
pilots (Q5). More effective pilot training can help to reduce 
these accidents and enhanced simulator fidelity enables an 
increase in simulator/flight ratio in training. This is generally 
true, of course, but has particular value for high-risk LOC-I 
simulations.
More recent model-update research [62] has proposed a 
new identification approach in the time-domain, Additive 
System-IDentification (ASID), to address the nonlinearities 
associated with complex manoeuvres, particularly at low 
speed (Q6). This is described in more detail in Ref. [63]. 
In the ASID approach the model parameters are identified 
sequentially based on their contribution to the local dynamic 
response of the system, i.e., over a defined time range. One 
or more candidate parameters, in a proposed model struc-
ture, are identified using the primary response characteristic 
of the rotorcraft; others are then identified in a sequential 
manner.
Fig. 15  Comparison of responses from lateral cyclic input with the 
renovated nonlinear F-B412 [59]
Fig. 16  Comparison of fit across perturbation and ASID approaches 
[63]
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The results in Fig. 16 illustrate the effectiveness of the 
ASID approach, comparing a 2311 input in hover FT data 
and the linear perturbation (Pert.) method. ASID was applied 
on the 6 degree of freedom roll dynamics, using an equation-
error process. The roll acceleration ASID ṗ curves in Fig. 16 
was constructed using the identified derivative values (e.g., 
rolling moment due to roll rate, Lp) derived from the cor-
responding flight test data (e.g., roll rate p), respectively.
Figure  16 shows the best fit with flight test data is 
achieved by the ASID method. The fit with linear perturba-
tion derivatives from the F-B412 diverges after 1.5 s, mainly 
due to Lq being significantly different from flight test. These 
results demonstrate the effectiveness of ASID at estimat-
ing derivatives that give an improved fit. Combining the 
results from different manoeuvres in a renovation process 
offers the potential for capturing a fuller range of physi-
cal effects that may be important, but only weakly present 
in simpler manoeuvres (Q6). This has particular relevance 
to the large amplitude excursions and accelerations during 
LOC-I situations.
Questions arise as to what is adequate fidelity to support 
training in rotorcraft LOC-I scenarios, not only prevention, 
but also inadvertent entry into such conditions and associ-
ated recovery strategies. Achieving anything close to physi-
cal realism, even generically, is considered a major challenge 
by the authors of this paper. Any type-specific characteris-
tics will likely demand extensive development. Compared 
with fixed-wing stall, rotorcraft LOC-I scenarios are likely 
to pose a higher risk to life due to the nature of rotorcraft 
dynamics and require considerably more complex model-
ling. Referring to Q6 in Sect. 3, addressing these challenges 
will certainly require further theoretical and experimental 
research into the underlying aeromechanics of, for example, 
VRS and LTRE, and creating sufficiently realistic real-time 
flight models to incorporate in training simulators. The flight 
models produce the motions, the accelerations, velocities 
and positions, which are transferred to the pilot as visual and 
vestibular cues. In LOC-I scenarios the vestibular motion 
cueing might be crucial to aid the pilot in identification of 
the problem. Fidelity issues relating to vestibular motion is 
the topic of the next section.
5  Vestibular motion cueing research
In 1910, Flight magazine [64] reported, “Even the most apt 
pupil is certain to find himself in difficulties at some time 
or another during his probation… The Invention, therefore, 
of a device which will enable the novice to obtain a clear 
conception of the workings of an aeroplane and conditions 
existent in the air without any risk personally or otherwise 
is to be welcomed without doubt. Several have already been 
Fig. 17  Sanders teacher [64]
Table 3  CS-FSTD(H) motion requirements [41]
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constructed to this end, and the Sanders Teacher is the lat-
est to enter the field.” The Sanders Teacher (Fig. 17) fea-
tured aircraft parts (a ‘first’ in simulators) and a turn-table 
and rocker system that allowed the trainee to experience 
the effect of wind in the simulator; the first step in ‘motion 
cueing’ (and by this we are considering vestibular motion 
cueing), and its benefit in simulator-based training is still 
being debated.
One of the challenges in this debate is the lack of support-
ing evidence concerning the benefit of motion cueing and 
how these might impact simulator certification standards. 
More than 20 years ago Burki-Cohen et al. [65] noted, “The 
existing standards for flight simulation qualification, all of 
which entail a requirement for platform motion cueing, have 
a 20-year record of meeting the requisite requirement for 
transfer of performance. In the absence of competing evi-
dence to the contrary, it is, therefore, prudent to maintain 
these standards in the interest of public safety” (Q7). In a 
subsequent paper, Longridge et al. [66] reported that, for 
fixed-wing aircraft, motion improved the acceptability of 
the simulator, pilot performance and control behaviour in the 
simulator, but found no evidence of the benefits of motion 
in transferring to the aircraft. McCauley [67], investigated 
the need for motion bases in army helicopter simulators 
and found that whilst flight simulators were identified as 
“unquestionably valuable for training safely”, no evidence 
to support the effectiveness of motion platforms for training 
was found.
When examining the current standards, there is no clear 
guidance on when motion is required for a given training 
task. As shown in Table 3, there are different motion hard-
ware requirements for the FSTD levels shown (e.g., A/B and 
C/D) but no rationale is provided for the validity of these 
criteria and no guidance is provided as to how motion drive 
algorithms should be tuned to maximise the motion envelope 
available for different rotorcraft/manoeuvres. In addition, 
there are no fidelity tolerances provided for the roll, pitch or 
sway motion envelopes and there is no linking of the motion 
envelope requirements shown in Table 3 to the flight-loop 
model parameters that are inputs to the motion drive laws, 
e.g., aircraft accelerations (Q8). Reference [68] suggests that 
this lack of acceleration proof-of-match requirements has 
led to deficiencies in simulator motion cueing especially in 
hover and low-speed flight conditions. For the ‘lower’ level 
FTD devices, there is no requirement for motion, since these 
are mainly intended for teaching aircraft systems and proce-
dures knowledge and skills.
Another potential ‘conflict’ between matching the flight-
loop fidelity tolerances and provision of motion cueing 
was noted by Casolaro et al. [69]. They reported achiev-
ing a match with simulator certification tolerances for the 
Dutch roll frequency and damping of a Super Puma Mk1 
simulation. When assessed in Visual Meteorological Condi-
tions, the pilots “concluded that the simulator was handling 
like the real helicopter”. However, despite no changes to 
the flight model, the pilots complained that the model was 
“too unstable and too difficult to manage” under Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions. Additional damping of the 
flight-model’s Dutch roll characteristics was implemented 
to satisfy the pilot’s subjective assessment of the fidelity of 
the model. The authors of Ref. [69] suggest that “distorted 
accelerations provided by the motion system and the delay 
introduced by the visual system” might be sources of the 
Fig. 18  Sinacori’s translational motion fidelity criteria [70]
Fig. 19  Sinacori’s rotational fidelity criteria [72]
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fidelity deficiency reported by the pilots. This reinforces the 
need to harmonise all elements of the fidelity assessment 
(most notably the flight model and motion cueing system) to 
ensure a rationale and repeatable fidelity assessment process 
is adopted.
Motion fidelity criteria for rotorcraft have been proposed 
by Sinacori [70] based on measures of the gain and phase 
shift between the flight-model output and the motion system 
commands at a frequency of 1rad/s. The criteria were devel-
oped from investigations of an ‘S’-turn manoeuvre along a 
runway at 60 kts with a six-degree-of-freedom model of a 
helicopter. Figure 18 shows Sinacori’s fidelity criteria for 
translational motion and the three-point fidelity rating scale 
used to elicit pilot opinion on the fidelity of the motion cues. 
It should be noted that Sinacori stated these criteria “have 
little or no support other than intuition”.
Despite this statement, Sinacori’s criteria have been the 
basis for motion fidelity testing. Hodge et al. [71] reviewed 
research undertaken for roll-sway motion tuning. Figure 19 
shows the results from this review. The different gains and 
break frequencies used in the studies are shown in paren-
thesis, suggesting that high fidelity motion can be achieved, 
based on Sinacori’s criteria, through selective tuning of the 
motion filter parameters.
Hodge et al. [72] used a short-stroke hexapod simula-
tor [73] to investigate ‘optimising’ the cues with third-order 
filters in the roll and sway axes (A1–A6 in Fig. 19 indicate 
the configurations tested in [72]). A 10-point motion fidel-
ity rating scale was devised to elicit pilot opinion, since the 
participating test pilots considered the previous three-point 
scale to be too coarse to distinguish the subtle differences 
in motion cues [74].
Pilots judged that good motion cues could be obtained 
with a small motion platform by careful selection of the 
roll and sway-axis motion gains (Kϕ, Ky) and that roll-axis 
break frequency (ωhpϕ) had a dominant effect on motion 
fidelity (see Fig. 20). The pilots also reported that at higher 
break frequencies they experienced an increased mis-match 
between the vestibular and visual motion cues. Lowering 
the roll gain ‘masks’ this effect by reducing the amplitude of 
the motion, making this mismatch less obvious, which could 
explain why the more favourable MFR ratings are concen-
trated at lower motion gains.
Whilst there have been several studies examining the 
effect of motion on single or limited axis tasks, there is still 
the need to examine the motion requirements for multi-axis 
tasks, considering aircraft with different levels of handling 
qualities undergoing a range of different dynamic manoeu-
vres. Manso et al. [75] conducted simulator experiments that 
examined the effect of motion cueing on task performance 
and workload for a range of test manoeuvres. Three test 
pilots flew three rotorcraft response types—Attitude Com-
mand Attitude Hold (ACAH), RCAH and bare airframe; 
Fig. 20  Effect of roll motion gain and break frequency on motion 
fidelity [72]
Fig. 21  HQR (upper) and SFR (lower) results for the precision hover 
task
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covering a wide range of handling qualities. The ADS-33E-
PRF test manoeuvres (bob-up, pirouette, precision hover, 
lateral reposition and accel/decel) were flown with differ-
ent levels of task aggressiveness. A comparison was made 
for each manoeuvre between testing with no motion and a 
motion case, with a subjectively tuned set of motion drive 
laws. For the precision hover task, the results indicate that, 
as the HQs degrade, there is a larger difference in the HQ 
ratings (HQRs) awarded for the no-motion versus motion 
cases (Fig. 21), [75]. The lack of vestibular feedback in the 
no-motion cases affected the pilot’s ability to detect the onset 
of any vehicle drift preventing desired positional perfor-
mance standards from being achieved.
The SFR scale was used to compare motion and no-
motion cases with the pilots ‘training’ in the motion case 
(assuming this reflects the real-world case) and then assess-
ing the effect of no-motion (i.e., testing in a fixed-based 
simulator) on the test manoeuvre. The assumption here is 
that, in lieu of being able to conduct a flight test, the motion 
case is representative of the real world and the assessment is 
examining the utility of training without motion. The pilots 
awarded poorer SFRs as the HQs degraded and comments 
indicated that they were lacking feedback from the motion 
platform which led to a degradation in task performance and 
required considerable task strategy adaptation. The results 
suggest that simulator motion fidelity requirements are not 
only task-based but are also dependent on the handling quali-
ties of the aircraft being flown. Both are, of course, closely 
linked to the levels of control activity demanded to accom-
plish a given task.
Task orientation is recognised as important in the han-
dling qualities community. Changing the focus of simulator 
standards to be more training-task led was made in the devel-
opment of ICAO 9625, initially for fixed-wing aircraft and 
subsequently expanded to rotorcraft [76], which attempted to 
establish the simulation fidelity levels required to support the 
range of training tasks carried out for different pilot licenses 
and ratings. Reference [76] recognizes the need for training 
specific features and fidelity requirements. Each simulation 
feature, e.g., cockpit layout, flight model, has a required 
level of fidelity, e.g., generic, representative and specific or 
none, if the feature is not required, for a given training task. 
Whilst it does not provide any new fidelity tolerances, Ref. 
[76] does include details of an objective motion cueing test 
(OMCT), which measures the performance of the complete 
motion system, including the motion drive algorithm [21]. 
In Ref. [21], it was noted that OMCT was developed from 
the assessment of fixed-wing simulators and further work is 
required to examine requirements for rotorcraft. This need 
was confirmed by Jones et al. [77] who examined the suit-
ability of OMCT criteria for a rotorcraft pirouette, lateral 
reposition and a pursuit tracking task. Motion fidelity ratings 
awarded by the pilots were not in agreement with the OMCT 
boundaries emphasising the need for research into defin-
ing rotorcraft-specific OMCT boundaries. A similar recom-
mendation was made by Dalmeijer et al. [78] who noted 
that whilst the OMCT requirements for heave motion were 
satisfactory for the rotorcraft tasks flown (precision hover 
and take-off and abort), they were not appropriate for the 
pitch and surge motion characteristics in these manoeuvres.
In light of current OMCT limitations for application to 
rotorcraft, Miletovic et al. [79] have developed an Eigen-
mode Distortion Method to attempt to address the previ-
ously identified gap in the CS linking the simulated vehicle’s 
response to the design of the motion drive algorithms. This 
method represents a first attempt to objectively link the vehi-
cle’s dynamics to the design of motion drive algorithms and 
warrants further development.
A challenge in discerning the utility of motion cueing in 
flight simulators from the published literature is that results 
are presented for different simulators, with different capabili-
ties, simulating different tasks, whilst using different flight 
models. As noted by Grant [80], experiments are rarely 
repeated before trying to extend the work using new meth-
ods. Hence, if the new study contradicts any previous work 
it is often unclear if this is due to a different simulator or test 
protocol being used. It is anticipated that understanding the 
possible contributions of vestibular motion cueing to the sim-
ulation of LOC-I will require a more coordinated approach 
to help inform future simulator and regulatory requirements.
Research to date on both motion cueing and flight-model 
fidelity has pointed to potential improvements that could be 
made to both operational flight simulators and associated 
training programmes. Building on this will establish new, 
higher, levels of confidence in the value of flight simulators 
for crew training.
6  Concluding remarks 
and recommendations
An examination of rotorcraft accident statistics has shown 
that, despite the concerted international efforts to reduce 
the accident numbers and rates, it is likely to be some time 
before significant reductions are achieved.
LOC-I events feature significantly in the accident sta-
tistics. Several initiatives have been launched to address 
this problem and some have been discussed in the paper 
but referring to Qs 1–5 in Sect. 3, further investigation is 
required here. The USHST, through its H-SE activities, are 
investigating these issues and the output from these activities 
needs to be disseminated to the wider community.
When faced with a similar problem in the fixed-wing air-
craft community, a coordinated international activity was 
established to develop the UPRT programme to tackle the 
problem. Some elements of UPRT can be transferred to 
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rotorcraft training, such as including startle in scenarios, (aer-
onautical science) education to develop skills for better aware-
ness and recognition and, most importantly, more effective 
use of flight simulators to support the overall training needs.
To improve flight models for use in LOC-I training, an 
assessment of current CS standards should first be under-
taken to identify, where new fidelity criteria/tolerances are 
required (Q6–Q8). This needs to be supported by activities 
to understand flight-model shortcomings. Several initiatives 
related to this have been launched, but they would benefit 
from being extended to a wider international community 
as was the case with ICATEE. Improvements in rotorcraft 
modelling should be physics-based and research is needed 
here to inform the development of new standards and fidelity 
improvement methods. The system identification ‘renovation’ 
approach outlined in this paper provides a means for identify-
ing model shortcomings and potential sources of deficiency.
In general, the simulation requirements must be driven by 
clear specifications of the training needs, related to the task, 
and including the definition of competencies that tend to fail 
prior to and during accident scenarios, and how to train these 
competencies in helicopter operations.
Understanding the simulation fidelity requirements for dif-
ferent levels of training device will be an important aspect of 
future LOC-I training. It is anticipated that different levels of 
LOC-I training could be conducted using a range of simulator 
types. This could include the use of desktop simulators and 
maturing technologies, such as virtual reality (see Q9).
The role of motion cueing in LOC-I training should be care-
fully examined. Whilst valuable research has been undertaken 
to examine how motion tuning can change the task performance 
achieved by pilots in different scenarios and devices, a con-
solidated approach using common fidelity metrics and meth-
ods should be developed. Without this, it would be difficult to 
provide the supporting evidence needed in any new standards 
as to how vestibular cueing should be provided in simulators.
The absence of fidelity requirements and standards 
for LOC-I simulation training points to the need for new 
research activity with planned outputs focussed on these 
aspects. Q6–Q8 in Sect. 3 identified the possible need for 
new research initiatives in this area and this has been rein-
forced by the activities reported in Sects. 4 and 5; some 
excellent work has been undertaken but more is required 
to address the issues Harris first highlighted in 2006 (Q1).
Driven by the need to improve rotorcraft safety, it is rec-
ommended that a programme similar to that adopted by the 
fixed-wing community is established with workshops focus-
ing on, for example, training needs, modelling and simula-
tion challenges, regulatory issues and other topics that need 
to be tackled to advance the state of the art in this area. 
Whilst some of this is currently being undertaken by the 
USHST, a more co-ordinated international effort between 
the regulators, operators and researchers is recommended.
Appendix 1: simulator fidelity rating scale (Ref. [50])
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